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abstract: This article synthesizes several different studies of Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s 
expressive conceptions of action and agency and identifies a related account in Deleuze’s 
Logic of Sense. It argues that such conceptions not only challenge familiar voluntarist 
accounts of action and agency; they also demand a reassessment of standard approaches 
to the relation between norms and action. For the voluntarist, an agent’s action is caused 
by the separate, prior intention of the agent. For expressivists, an agent’s intention is 
inseparable from the action expressing it and nonisolatable from the expression of this 
intention-action in interpretative activity. For the voluntarist, the norms governing action 
can be thought of as more or less freestanding, entering into the prior formation of the 
agent’s intention. For the expressivist, the norm or principle on which an agent acts 
will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action expressing it, as well 
as through interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes 
place in a social space governed by more basic norms concerning the offering of act-
descriptions, recognition, and social and hermeneutical struggle. A number of impor-
tant differences among Hegel’s, Nietzsche’s, and Deleuze’s accounts are identified, and 
their significance is explored.
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1. From Voluntarism to Expressivism: The Question of Normativity
In relation to the field of individual action in general, normativity is stan-
dardly understood in terms of “oughtness.” More precisely, norms are con-
ceived as making claims upon how we ought to act. As Christine Korsgaard 
puts it in her landmark work, The Sources of Normativity, norms command, 
oblige, guide, or recommend certain actions. Morality, to put it crudely, 
consists in that list of things that one really ought to do. And the normative 
question is the question of what justifies the claims that norms or morals 
make on us to perform certain actions and refrain from others.1
A number of different answers can be given to this question about the 
“sources of normativity,” but I will not canvass them here.2 What I will do 
instead is challenge the terms in which the normative question has been 
set up. Indeed, this way of thinking about morals and norms and their 
relation to action presupposes a certain conception of action and agency, 
namely, a voluntarist conception. On this conception, there are two separate 
elements of action—a physical movement and a mental state such as an 
intention—and this mental state temporally precedes and causes the physi-
cal movement. Now, it is only with this distinction in hand that normativity 
is typically discussed. Indeed, in order to be guiding or obliging, already 
determinate morals or norms are supposed to enter the scene at the level 
of the formation of the agent’s intention—the intention that will in turn be 
the cause of the act.3 With reference to formation of the prior intention, the 
attendant action can then be evaluated: an action will be “good” insofar as 
the mental state that causes the physical movement is appropriately consti-
tuted in relation to the relevant norms. And as part of this evaluation, we 
ask what justifies the claims these norms made on the agent to perform 
this action.
But in fact, what this account hinges on—namely, the voluntarist con-
ception of action and agency—has been challenged by thinkers such as 
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze, all of whom, in various places, defend an 
expressive conception of action and agency. Instead of taking intentions as 
primary in the explanation of action, these thinkers take actions to be pri-
mary in the explanation of the intentions that animate them, and at two lev-
els: first, for these thinkers, intentions are ontologically inseparable from the 
unfolding of the actions that express them; and second, the “sense” of these 
intentions-actions is nonisolatable from how they are expressed in inter-
pretative or sense-making activity. As Robert Pippin usefully  formulates it, 
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for expressivists such as Hegel and Nietzsche (and, I would add, Deleuze), 
agents are not behind their actions, as they are on the voluntarist account. 
Agents are, rather, “out there” in the actions that express their intentions, 
and the actions themselves are “out there” as well: expressed in their mul-
tiple interpretations.4
But now, when we take actions to be primary in relation to the men-
tal states that animate them, what can be said about the relation between 
norms and individual action? Does normativity still come into the picture? 
It does, but not primarily at the level of the prior formation of an intention 
that subsequently causes an action. Normativity, rather, enters the picture 
at three related levels. First, normativity enters the picture at the level of 
“act-descriptions,” that is, insofar as there are normative, sociohistorical 
constraints as to what could count as a correct or appropriate act-description 
in a given context. Second, normativity enters the picture at the level of the 
“success conditions” for an action. Whereas on the voluntarist conception 
an action is successful if the agent’s prior intention has been fulfilled, on 
the expressive conception a successful action is a “normative status” that 
depends on the agent recognizing herself, and being recognized by others, 
as responsible for an act falling under an agreed-upon description. Finally, 
normativity enters the picture at the level of how one ought to respond to 
conflicting act-descriptions. The picture of normativity that emerges here 
thus contrasts markedly with the voluntarist’s understanding of it. Indeed, 
whereas on a voluntarist conception, determinate, pregiven norms enter 
into the formation of an agent’s intention prior to that agent’s action, on 
the expressive conception, the norm or principle that an agent will be held 
to have been intentionally acting on will be produced over time, through the 
unfolding of the action that expresses it, as well as through struggle over 
the description or “sense” of that action.
In what follows, I would first like to explore how Hegel and Nietzsche 
can be understood to be critics of voluntarist conceptions of agency and 
defenders of expressive conceptions of agency. As part of this, I will 
explain how intentions-actions are themselves “normative statuses” that 
rely on normative attitudes regarding what counts as an appropriate act-
description, the success conditions of an action, and how inevitable con-
flict between act-descriptions ought to be dealt with. I will then explore 
Deleuze’s approach to these issues in his The Logic of Sense.5 In relation 
to this task, the previous analyses of contemporary work on Hegel and 
Nietzsche can be thought of as functioning in three ways. First, they will 
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have motivated the idea that expressive approaches to action and agency 
belong to an established tradition, of which Deleuze’s Logic of Sense is argu-
ably a part. Second, the earlier analyses will have brought to light the two 
major theses of expressive agency—the “inseparability” and “nonisolat-
ability” theses, indicated above.6 These two theses can then be shown to 
be present in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense. Finally, the studies of Hegel and 
Nietzsche will have brought to light the three respects in which normativity 
relates to expressive conceptions of agency: at the level of the appropriate-
ness of act-descriptions, at the level of success conditions for actions, and 
at the level of what ought to be done about conflicting act-descriptions. 
And again, these three levels of normativity can be shown to be present 
in The Logic of Sense. By way of conclusion, I will argue that Nietzsche’s 
and Deleuze’s positions differ in one significant respect from Hegel’s, 
namely, with respect to the norms governing how one ought to respond to 
conflicting act-descriptions. Finally, I will make some brief remarks about 
Deleuze’s approach to ethics in The Logic of Sense and how this differs from 
a morality-based approach to ethics that presupposes a voluntarist concep-
tion of action and agency.
2. Hegel: Making Oneself a Reality Through Action
Charles Taylor begins an influential essay on Hegel’s philosophy of action 
by asking what distinguishes human action from other kinds of events.7 
The answer, as traditionally conceived, is the category of intentions: actions 
are the intentional doings of agents, and this is what makes them distinct 
from mere physical happenings. There are, however, two different ways of 
conceiving of the relationship between actions and intentions: a “causal” or 
“voluntarist” conception and a “qualitative” or “expressive” conception of 
the kind defended by Hegel. According to Taylor, voluntarists distinguish 
two elements of action—a physical movement and a psychological state 
such as an intention—and in such a way that the intention temporally 
precedes and causes the physical movement. The qualitative or expressive 
conception, by contrast, understands actions as “inhabited by the purposes 
which direct them, so that action and purpose are ontologically insepara-
ble.”8 On this latter view, since intentions cannot be understood as separate 
from the actions they animate, they cannot be said to cause them in any 
metaphysically interesting way.
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Taylor explains that, for Hegel, mental states such as intentions are not 
mere givens to which the agent in question has privileged access. Rather, 
intentions must be understood fundamentally through the category of 
action, and on two levels. On one level, our intentions are the reflections 
of the goals of an active life process, namely, the activity of Spirit that we, 
in our doings, embody in various partial ways. At first, however, the goals 
of this life process are poorly understood or formulated. On a second level, 
then, the inner reflection of the life process is transformed by our activity 
of trying to adequately formulate, in an appropriate “expressive medium,” 
what it is we are doing. An agent’s awareness of what it is he is “really” 
doing is thus not a given but something to be achieved: a mental form that 
is generated entirely from action as the reflective understanding of what 
it is he is doing. And this achievement would ultimately culminate in the 
agent clearly seeing what Spirit is doing through him or seeing the identity 
of the world activity with his own.9 As Taylor writes:
We have two related activities. There is a fundamental activity of Spirit, 
which it tries to grasp through the various levels of self-formulation. 
These two mutually conditioning activities are at first out of phase but 
are destined in the end to coincide perfectly. That is because it will 
come clear at the end that the goal of the whole life process was that 
Spirit come to understand itself, and at the same time the life process 
itself will be entirely transparent as an embodiment of this purpose. 
But this perfect coincidence only comes at the end. And it only comes 
through the overcoming of noncoincidence, where what the pattern 
of activity is differs from what this pattern says.10
Taylor’s explication of Hegel’s qualitative account of intentions-actions 
thus gives us a conception of “expressive agency” resting on two theses: an 
inseparability thesis and a nonisolatability thesis. On the one hand, Tay-
lor’s Hegel affirms the ontological inseparability of intentions and action 
at two levels: effective action and expressive action. On the other hand, he 
affirms the nonisolatability of an agent’s intention-action from the “expres-
sive medium” through which it is understood—a medium composed of 
concepts and symbols, as well as historically situated cultural institutions 
and practices.11
Robert Pippin also endorses an expressive understanding of Hegel’s 
conception of agency. Like Taylor, Pippin understands Hegel to have 
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rejected the voluntarist approach to action and to have, rather, affirmed an 
expressive account of action and agency along with what I have called the 
inseparability and nonisolatability theses with regard to intentions-actions. 
However, he wants to rid Hegel of the metaphysically heavy baggage that 
Taylor attributes to him, namely, the theory of “Cosmic Spirit,” which con-
ceives human action merely as the vehicle for Spirit’s progress to full self-
consciousness.12 In contrast to Taylor’s emphasis on the underlying role of 
Spirit, Pippin primarily speaks of the sociality of action: the way in which 
an agent’s self-relation—that is, her take on what she is doing and why—
is mediated by her relation to others.13 In other words, for Pippin, Hegel 
understands one’s self-description of one’s action, along with one’s self-
ascription of one’s intention, as being subject to a form of social negotia-
tion or mediation.
Pippin writes that, in the second half of chapter 5 of the Jena Phenom-
enology, Hegel maintains that it is a mistake to separate the inner intention 
from the outer action and to explain action with reference to the isolated 
separate intention as prior cause.14 In other words, Hegel understands 
intentions to be inseparable from the actions that express them, which 
implies that, even for the agent, intentions can only be determined retro-
spectively once the deed has actually been performed. As Hegel puts it in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, “An individual cannot know what he [really] 
is until he has made himself a reality through action.”15 Or again: “Ethical 
self-consciousness now learns from its deed the developed nature of what 
it actually did.”16
But Pippin also argues that this thesis about the inseparability of the 
intention and the action goes hand in hand with what I have called the non-
isolatability thesis. The idea here is that, if the intention is inseparable from 
the deed that expresses it, and so if the agent has no privileged authority 
with respect to the nature of his deed simply by virtue of being “behind” 
the deed in a causal sense, then the deed is inevitably open to contestation 
within the agent’s social community. As Pippin argues, “My intention is 
thus doubly ‘real’: it is out there ‘in’ the deed, and the deed is essentially 
out there ‘for others.’”17 Or again, as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, the 
“action is thus only the translation of its individual content into the objective 
element, in which it is universal and recognized, and it is just the fact that 
it is recognized that makes the deed a reality.”18
But now, it follows from this that an agent would not be able to unprob-
lematically understand herself to be performing a particular action if her 
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community did not receive it in much the same way. Moreover, the agent 
would not have executed her intention successfully if her community did 
not ascribe to her both the act-description and the intention she ascribed to 
herself.19 Pippin gives the following helpful illustration of this idea:
You may intend to signal in a meeting that you wish to speak and so 
raise your hand. But if in that society, raising one’s hand expresses 
that one is communing with one’s ancestors and wishes to be left 
alone, then you did not signal anything and so cannot be said to have 
realized the intention of signaling. (If an intention is a subjective 
resolution that can be manifested in a deed, then you cannot suc-
cessfully intend what cannot be expressed in a deed in that context, 
although you can imagine what it would be to realize such an expres-
sion and in a self-deluded fantasy take yourself to have done so . . .).20
So, following Pippin, there are for Hegel sociohistorical, normative 
constraints as to what could count as a correct or appropriate act-descrip-
tion. What is more, a successful action is itself a normative status that 
depends on the agent recognizing himself, and being recognized by his 
community, as being “in” an action falling under an agreed-upon act-
description. But we should also note here that, for Pippin, Hegel does not 
simply dissolve the agent’s “inner” intention into its “outer” expression. He 
points to the Moralität section of the Philosophy of Right and Hegel’s insis-
tence on the “right of intention” and “right of knowledge,” that is, the right 
to have attributed to one only those deeds that one intended and whose 
consequences one could have foreseen.21 In other words, if unforeseeable 
contingencies intervene during the unfolding of my action, and in such a 
way that what actually happens diverges wildly from what I intended and 
could reasonably have foreseen, Hegel would not claim that this external 
event manifests what I truly intended. Indeed, in this section, Hegel argues 
that Oedipus taking personal responsibility for his unwitting parricide and 
incest is mistaken and is primarily due to the legal codes of antiquity not 
attaching enough importance to the dimension of moral subjectivity. In 
such cases, Hegel thinks, we ought to distinguish between a mere deed and 
an action proper: between Tat (something that happened because of me) 
and Handlung (a eed that can be attributed to me). Nevertheless, follow-
ing Pippin, despite his insistence on the importance of the rights of inten-
tion and knowledge in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel would still  maintain 
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that the content of an intention cannot be determined apart from what is 
 manifested in action and from what is made of that action by others. As 
Pippin writes,
There is no tension between the Phenomenology account and the Phi-
losophy of Right, because Hegel is clearly separating two distinct ques-
tions: what role should the expressions of intention (and an agent’s 
act-description) play in a final determination of what was done and 
who was responsible and to what extent, and, secondly, how can we 
determine the content of any such intention? The latter involves not 
only the interpretative task of knowing what doing this or that would 
mean in our community, but how to understand the relation between 
what you actually did, and what was thereby expressed as your real 
intention, regardless of your own avowals.22
This brings us to a third contemporary philosopher who has attrib-
uted to Hegel an expressive conception of agency: Robert Brandom, and 
in particular in his as-yet-unpublished A Spirit of Trust.23 Brandom is much 
closer to Pippin than to Taylor, in that he, like Pippin, emphasizes the social 
dimension of action and agency. But what is of particular interest for our 
purposes here is that Brandom gives us a very interesting account of the 
way in which, in Hegel, the difference between first- and third-person per-
spectives on intentions-actions is mediated by a community structured by 
reciprocal confession and forgiveness.
In parts 4 and 5 of A Spirit of Trust, Brandom proposes that we under-
stand Hegel as saying that one and the same action can fall under different 
descriptions corresponding to the agent’s perspective on her action and the 
community’s perspective on that action. The content of an action, then, will 
be what is both acknowledged by the agent and attributed by the commu-
nity, which is to say, a product of a process of reciprocal recognition.
In order to explain how two divergent perspectives on one content can 
be synthesized, Brandom initially appeals to Frege’s distinction between 
sense and reference. Following this distinction, the action “in-itself,” the 
referent, must be distinguished from its different senses, that is, from 
what it is for the agent as well as what it is for the community. The action 
 in-itself can then be conceived as the normative product of the recognitive 
mediation of these different perspectives, that is to say, whereby the differ-
ent senses appear as semantically determining and cognitively presenting 
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the action in-itself, but only insofar as these senses are able to form part 
of a story or “recollection” (in Hegel’s sense), told by both the agent and 
the community, in which these different senses feature as better or worse 
attempts to present the action in-itself.
The second step in Brandom’s argument is to suggest that, in the con-
cluding eleven paragraphs of the Phenomenology’s “Spirit” chapter, Hegel 
sketches how we can understand the different perspectives on action—the 
agent’s and the community’s—to be mediated through reciprocal confession 
and forgiveness. Confession, on Brandom’s interpretation, involves acknowl-
edging a disparity between sense and reference. In other words, both the 
agent and the community must confess the particularity and contingency 
of their attitudes and acknowledge that what the action is for them, subjec-
tively, is not what the action objectively is in-itself, that is to say, apart from 
any particular subjective perspective. In Brandom’s terms, mutual confession 
means that the agent and his community treat their intentions and beliefs 
as normative statuses, which is to say, as commitments to which they are 
entitled only insofar as these are acknowledged by one’s peers as standing 
in legitimate inferential relations with other accepted intentions and beliefs 
within an intersubjective “space of reasons.”
But as well as confession, what is required is forgiveness. On Brandom’s 
interpretation, forgiving overcomes the confessed disparity between what 
the action is for the agent and for the community and what the action is 
in-itself, apart from these subjective perspectives. Forgiving, then, is the 
“recollective” labor of finding a concept for the action—a concept that is 
being expressed more or less well by the subjective conceptions endorsed 
by the agent and her community. In other words, the task of forgiving is to 
reveal the confessed disparity between sense and reference as a retrospec-
tively necessary phase of a process of more adequately expressing what the 
action is in-itself. Through mutual confession and forgiveness, then, both 
the agent and the community acknowledge that what recollectively shows 
up as the action in-itself is a normative status that has authority over their 
merely subjective perspectives on it.
What we can now conclude from Taylor’s, Pippin’s, and Brandom’s 
expressive accounts of Hegel’s philosophy of action is that normative 
considerations do not primarily and straightforwardly enter upon the 
scene at the level of the formation of the agent’s intention—the inten-
tion that subsequently causes an action. Rather, given the inseparability 
and nonisolatability theses with regard to intentions-actions, we must say 
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that normativity enters the picture at three related levels: (a) at the level 
of  act-descriptions, because there are normative constraints inherent in 
 particular  sociohistorical formations as to what can count as an appropriate 
act-description; (b) at the level of what counts as a successful action, because 
a successful action is a “normative status” that depends on the agent rec-
ognizing himself, and being recognized by others, as responsible for the 
act falling under a particular act-description; and (c) at the level of how we 
ought to respond to conflicting act-descriptions—for Hegel, in cases where 
there are conflicting act-descriptions, a process of mutual confession and 
forgiveness is called for. In short, then, for Hegel, the norm or principle an 
agent will be held to have been acting on is not given in advance, entering 
into the formation of the agent’s intention in a determinate way prior to the 
act. The norm or principle on which an agent acts will, rather, be produced 
over time through the unfolding of the action that expresses it, as well as 
through the eventual resolution of interpretative struggle over the meaning 
of that action, all of which takes place in an intersubjective space governed 
by norms of communication, reciprocal recognition, and “confession and 
forgiveness.”
3. Nietzsche: “The Deed Is Everything”
Pippin has also recently put forward a particularly interesting, 
 Hegel-inspired analysis of Nietzsche’s famous claim about agency in the 
first essay of Genealogy of Morality (§13), namely, that there is no “doer” 
behind the deed and that “the deed is everything.”24 Pippin stresses in par-
ticular that while Nietzsche here is clearly repudiating the slavish, meta-
physical, and Christian conception of “free will,” this particular passage 
does not license us to take the route often traveled in Nietzsche scholarship, 
which consists in interpreting Nietzsche as wanting to naturalize all talk 
of motives, goals, intentions, and so on. One version of this interpreta-
tion understands Nietzsche to deny that the subject is free in a metaphysi-
cally strong sense to choose to do one thing over another and to, rather, 
claim that the causal determinants of action are to be sought in various 
physiological and psychological facts about individuals or types of individu-
als.25 But the problem with this interpretation is that even if we substitute 
material substances and corporeal states for an immaterial soul, we are still 
positing—and in opposition to Nietzsche’s explicit thesis—a “doer” who is 
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located causally behind the deed. Another line of Nietzsche interpretation 
understands Nietzsche to explain “what happens” as the manifestation of 
underlying and interconnected forces. But again, following Pippin, this will 
not help us break out of the causal, “doer behind the deed” model of action. 
For either we must say that the forces themselves cause what happens, or 
we must have reference to persisting substances or subjects in which these 
forces and the relations between them inhere as the determinants of action. 
Either way, we will still have reference to a causal instance before or behind 
the deed. As Nietzsche puts it in this same passage in the Genealogy, “The 
scientists do no better [than the Christians] when they say ‘force moves, 
force causes’ and such like,—all our science . . . has not rid itself of the 
changelings foisted upon it, the ‘subjects.’”26
So Nietzsche rejects the causal conception of agency in both its meta-
physical and naturalistic forms. Pippin notes, however, that Nietzsche 
remains committed to a traditional conception of act-descriptions, whereby 
an “act is individuated as an act mainly by reference to the agent’s inten-
tions.”27 Indeed, the Genealogy itself is clearly a story about social struggle 
between human agents—slaves, masters, priests, and so on—to whom 
Nietzsche attributes complex sets of unconscious motivations for what they 
do (ressentiment, feelings of powerlessness, will to mastery, will to noth-
ingness, etc.). So the question becomes: How can we reconcile the idea 
that what individuates action is the intention of the agent with the idea that 
there is no “doer” behind the deed in a causal sense? Pippin’s response is to 
read Nietzsche as offering, and along similar lines to Hegel, an “expressive” 
account of agency—which is to say, an account of agency that does not deny 
that there is a subject of the deed but asserts that the agent is not so much 
behind the deed as in the deed that expresses her agency.28
Following Pippin, the Nietzschean expressive account of agency is 
characterized by the two broad theses about agency identified in Hegel: the 
“inseparability” thesis and the “nonisolatability” thesis. The inseparability 
thesis, as has been seen, holds that the agent is not separate from his deed. 
In other words, the agent, with his intention, does not stand behind the 
deed as a separately identifiable element of action, such that the prior inten-
tion causes the action. Rather, an agent’s intentions (and inner life more 
generally) cannot be grasped independently of what he effectively does. 
In fact, for Nietzsche, it appears that this understanding of agency is part 
and parcel of the warrior-noble’s understanding of his agency, since for 
him one simply is what one does. And it is in this way that Pippin analyzes 
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Nietzsche’s infamous claim in the Genealogy I.13 that the strength of the 
“bird of prey” cannot not “express itself” as strength: an agent cannot be 
said to have “inner” strength or resolve in any meaningful sense indepen-
dently of the “outer” expression of strength or resolve.29 Furthermore, the 
inseparability thesis is visible in Nietzsche’s description of the “sovereign 
individual” in the second essay of Genealogy (§2). As David Owen and Aaron 
Ridley have convincingly argued, the sovereign individual’s “prerogative to 
promise” is derived from the way in which he unfailingly carries out his 
commitments in concrete actions regardless of changing circumstances (or 
as Nietzsche puts it, “even ‘in the face of fate’”).30 As Pippin summarizes 
the core idea, the “deed alone can show one who one is, what one is actually 
committed to. . . . [W]hat I end up with, what I actually did, is all that can 
count fully as my intention realized or expressed.”31
The nonisolatability thesis, in turn, holds that the content of an 
agent’s intention cannot be determined in isolation from a larger complex 
of social, historical, and linguistic factors. Hegel, of course, argued that 
an agent’s intentions cannot be made sense of in isolation from certain 
historically contingent social conditions. But Nietzsche also appears to 
affirm a view of this kind. Indeed, Nietzsche treats the unequal distribu-
tion of social power (between the nobility and the slaves) as an essential 
element in understanding the action broadly described as the “slave revolt 
in morality.”32 Nietzsche also argues that, at different points in history, 
the rise to power of various social classes (warrior, priestly, etc.) coin-
cided with the imposition of these classes’ evaluations and interpretations 
of actions and agents. We can think here of the etymological evidence 
Nietzsche presents for the historical passage from evaluations made in 
terms of “good and bad” and their analogues to evaluations in terms of 
“good and evil” and their analogues.33 We can also think of Nietzsche’s 
discussion in the second essay of the Genealogy of the various historical 
interpretations and reinterpretations of the “purpose of punishment.”34 
Such analyses confirm the idea that, for Nietzsche, an understanding of 
the intentions-actions of agents cannot not be isolated from wider social 
and hermeneutical struggle.35
So this is what Nietzsche’s expressive understanding of agency 
amounts to for Pippin: the subject is not behind the deed, but neither is the 
subject “absent.” Rather, the subject “is ‘out there’ in his deeds, but the deeds 
are ‘out there’ too, multiply interpretable, and that means, in Nietzsche’s 
understanding, that they can be in multiple ways ‘appropriated’ by others. 
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These interpretations are themselves already expressions of various types 
that cannot be isolated from historical time and from the contestations of 
their own age.”36
In support of the presence of this expressive account of agency in 
Nietzsche’s work more broadly, Pippin also cites the following passage 
from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “I wish your self were in the deed like the 
mother is in the child.”37 For Pippin, what this image suggests is that a
mother both “sees” herself in the child and yet acknowledges the 
child’s independence as a person in her own right, suggesting that 
once we “launch” a deed, it takes on a life of its own in the world 
. . . , taken up by others in ways we could not have anticipated, per-
haps manifesting aspects of our character that we would not have 
anticipated. The image further deflates any notion of a strict individ-
ual ownership of the deed, even as it proposes another sort of attach-
ment to our deeds as somehow still “our own” even if independent of 
us and from any individual causal agency.38
This sounds remarkably like Hegel’s expressive understanding of 
agency. However, Pippin notes that there remain some significant dif-
ferences between Hegel’s and Nietzsche’s conceptions. In particular, 
Nietzsche in no way defends the normative demand for different perspec-
tives on action to be overcome through reciprocal confession and forgive-
ness. Indeed, as Pippin puts it, for Nietzsche “there is no best, appropriate, 
finally reconciling resolution to these sorts of conflicts [over the nature 
of actions]. ‘There is’ only the conflict.”39 Of course, this is not to say that 
Nietzsche would not understand the “success conditions” for actions in 
the expressive terms outlined in the previous section. Indeed, it follows 
naturally from the nonisolatability thesis that a successful action is a type 
of “normative status” dependent on the agent of that action recognizing 
herself in it in much the same way that others recognize her. For Nietzsche, 
then, it appears that the recognitive relations on which determinate actions 
depend could only be established within particular forms of life or between 
forms of life whose modes of evaluation are commensurable.
With regard to the relation between action and normativity, then, it 
is clear that in rejecting the voluntarist conception of agency, Nietzsche 
rejects the (Christian and slavish) idea that pregiven norms enter in a 
straightforward fashion into the prior formation of an intention that 
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 subsequently causes an action. Nietzsche is, as is well known, a strident 
critic of morality. However, he does not reject normativity in its entirety. As 
we have seen, he understands there to be normative constraints operative 
within different perspectives or forms of life as to what could count as an 
appropriate act-description or intention-ascription, as well as what could 
count as a successful action. However, unlike Hegel, Nietzsche does not 
affirm that there is a further, perspective-transcendent norm demanding 
the overcoming and final reconciliation of conflicting act-descriptions. In 
fact, and although this is not a point explored by Pippin, Nietzsche places 
great value on what we might call “perspectival agonism.” Such agonism 
is, for Nietzsche, a positive phenomenon—indeed, one that ought to be 
sought out and safeguarded.40 Nietzsche often affirms “the value of having 
enemies,” which is to say, “worthy enemies” in competition with whom 
one’s own deeds are distinguished or individuated.41 In the Genealogy, more 
particularly, Nietzsche stresses the importance of a “pathos of distance” 
from others for the creation and naming of values.42 But as he also makes 
clear elsewhere, this pathos of distance from others makes possible some-
thing much more important: a “pathos of self-distancing,” which is to say, 
a striving for continual “self-overcoming.”43 The argument here appears 
to be that if, as on the expressive account just presented, an agent is “out 
there” in his deeds and these deeds are “out there” for others, then by seek-
ing out, cultivating, and maintaining nondestructive perspectival conflict 
with others, an agent keeps forever open the process of the production of 
the norms on which he understands himself to act and which constitute his 
character.44 In this way, following the Nietzschean formulation, the agent 
is more fully able to “become what he is,” namely, an eternally self-creating 
creature who expressively engineers his own laws of action but who never-
theless does not stand behind his deeds as a “doer” in the causal sense.45 In 
short, then, while Nietzsche would reject the Hegelian norms of confession 
and forgiveness for the overcoming of conflicting act-descriptions, it can be 
argued that he would replace them with norms aimed at the cultivation and 
safeguarding of a productive, perspectival agonism.
4. Deleuze: Becoming Worthy of Our Actions
Turning now to Deleuze, there is a strong argument to be made for there 
being an expressive account of agency implicit in his 1969 work, The Logic 
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of Sense.46 Indeed, putting to one side Deleuze’s complex  relationship to 
Hegel and Nietzsche, evidence can be found in The Logic of Sense for the 
two “expressive” theses about action and agency identified above, namely, 
the inseparability and nonisolatability theses. What is more, despite his 
rejection of the voluntarist conception of agency and the associated idea 
of “moral” normativity, there is nevertheless evidence that Deleuze under-
stands there to be normative constraints on act-descriptions and suc-
cessful actions. As will be seen, however, Deleuze remains much more 
Nietzschean than Hegelian on the question of what ought to be done 
about a conflict between first- and third-person perspectives on action.
If we understand the inseparability thesis as the thesis that an agent’s 
intention does not cause her action so much as come to be revealed or 
expressed in the unfolding of the action itself, then Deleuze affirms a ver-
sion of this idea. Two points can be noted here. First of all, in the Second 
Series of The Logic of Sense, and following the Stoics, Deleuze makes a strict 
ontological distinction between the realm of bodies and causes and the 
realm of incorporeal events.47 This division entails that actions, insofar as 
they are a type of incorporeal event, never belong to the same ontological 
register as psychological causes or the physical states of brains on which 
psychological causes are sometimes said to supervene. And insofar as they 
do not belong to the same ontological register, for Deleuze, actions cannot 
be said to be caused by intentions or desires or any other kind of psychologi-
cal cause.
The second and related point is that Deleuze nevertheless continues 
to speak of “willing the event,” particularly in the “Twenty-First Series of 
the Event.” The difficulty here, of course, is that willing the incorporeal 
action-event cannot be understood as “causing” an action to take place. 
The argument that needs to be made is thus that an agent’s “willing” is 
not behind an action in the causal sense; it is, rather, inseparable from the 
incorporeal action-event that expresses it. As Deleuze puts it, the idea of a 
corporeal or “organic will” must be exchanged for that of a “spiritual will.” 
Moreover, the incorporeal event itself creates in us this spiritual will.48 We 
are not the direct causes of action, it seems. The action-as-incorporeal-
event, rather, reveals something about the agent, such that, as Deleuze 
puts it, “action is produced by the offspring of the event.”49 In short, then, 
for Deleuze, we must understand the will, our intentions, and so on to be 
inseparable from the action-event and to become clear only  retrospectively 
as the action-event unfolds in its own, ideal and  incorporeal dimension.
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Turning now to the nonisolatability thesis, if we understand this as 
the idea that an agent’s action is not isolatable from how it appears and is 
interpreted in public space, then Deleuze also affirms a version of this idea 
in The Logic of Sense, particularly in the Third and Fifth Series. Again, two 
points can be made in this regard. The first is that, for Deleuze, events in 
general exist only as expressed or expressible sense.50 Deleuze’s position 
here is once again derived from the Stoics: bodies are the causes of every-
thing that happens, but what happens—the effect or event—is a proposi-
tional item that comes to be true of the bodies denoted by that proposition.51 
The proposition, however, envelops its own internal division. On the one 
hand, it denotes a body or bodies; on the other hand, it expresses a sense 
that is, in Frege’s terms, the “mode of presentation” of the referent.52 But 
the sense expressed by a proposition is not identical with the words used. 
As Deleuze argues, alluding to Frege’s discussion of sense and reference in 
indirect contexts (ascriptions of propositional attitudes), the sense of a first 
speaker’s declarative sentence, while not identical with the words used, can 
always be denoted by a second sentence uttered by another speaker. More-
over, since this second speaker’s utterance expresses a sense that is not 
identical with the words used, the sense of the second speaker’s utterance 
can always be taken as the object of a third utterance. The third utterance, 
in turn, expresses a sense that is not identical with the words used—and 
so on.53 Deleuze thus appears to be arguing here that, if a first speaker’s 
declarative sentence expresses a sense that is a mode of presentation of its 
referent, when a second speaker’s sentence takes the sense of the first sen-
tence as its object, it expresses a sense that is a mode of presentation both 
of the sense of the first speaker’s sentence and of the referent of the first 
speaker’s sentence.54 In other words, if the action-event exists as the sense 
of propositions bearing on what happens, it also exists as the sense of the 
propositions bearing on the propositions bearing on what happens. The 
action-event, in short, cannot be isolated from an ongoing and open-ended 
process of making sense both of what happens and of what is said about 
what happens in an intersubjective space.
The second point to be made about nonisolatability in The Logic of 
Sense is that, in the “Twentieth Series on the Moral Problem in Stoic Phi-
losophy” and, more particularly, in the “Twenty-First Series of the Event,” 
Deleuze explicitly talks about the “actor” or agent in theatrical terms, that 
is, as the one who acts before an audience.55 What is implied by Deleuze’s 
discussion here is that actions-events have a “public” character, which is to 
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say, once again, that they cannot be isolated from their multiple “modes of 
 presentation” in a complex process of sense-making.56 In short, paraphras-
ing Pippin, we can say that, for Deleuze, the actor or agent is not so much 
behind his actions as “out there” in the actions that express his intentions; 
but these actions are “out there” as well, insofar as they are multiply inter-
pretable by others, which is to say, expressible in perspectivally multiple 
propositions.
Now, these two theses about action and agency—inseparability and 
nonisolatability—come together in Deleuze’s discussion of action in the 
“Twenty-Ninth Series—Good Intentions Are Inevitably Punished.” What 
also comes to the fore in this series is that Deleuze understands there to be 
normative constraints on what can count as appropriate act-descriptions, 
as well as normative conditions for what can count as successful action. 
Moreover, with regard to what ought to be done about conflicting act-
descriptions, we can also perceive in this series a Nietzschean, as opposed 
to Hegelian, approach.
In the Twenty-Ninth Series, which is couched in a psychoanalytic 
vocabulary, Deleuze argues that all actions are always-already divided in 
two. On the one hand, we have the agent’s “image of action,” that is, an 
image of what she is purposefully doing. On the other hand, we have the 
action-event in its nonisolatability from what Lacanians would call the 
structural-symbolic dimension of language and culture, governed by norms 
specifying how and what concepts should be applied in making sense of 
what happens. Deleuze writes: “On one hand, the entire image of action is 
projected on a physical surface, where it appears as willed . . . ; on the other, 
the entire result of the action is projected on a metaphysical surface, where 
the action appears as produced and not willed. . . . The famous mechanism 
of ‘denegation’ (that’s not what I wanted . . .), with all its importance with 
respect to the formation of thought, must be interpreted as expressing the 
passage from one surface to the other.”57
So we have the agent and his imagined intentions, on the one hand; 
and, on the other hand, we have the production of the sense of that action 
in a public space and the retrospective attribution of responsibility for that 
action to the agent. Of course, insofar as the agent and his community agree 
about the appropriateness of each other’s act-descriptions, they can be said 
to recognize the same conceptual norms. And insofar as both the agent 
and his community recognize him in an action described in an agreed-
upon way, the action will have been successful. However, when there is 
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 disagreement about what the agent is doing, reciprocal recognition has 
failed. This situation will, of course, upset the agent’s sense of autonomy 
and create a problem for him—the problem Deleuze captures in the phrase 
“That’s not what I wanted.”
But now, with regard to this situation, it can be remarked that Deleuze 
is in no way concerned with the Hegelian normative obligation to recon-
cile first- and third-person perspectives on action. Indeed, Deleuze here is 
much more Nietzschean in his approach, insofar as he views the disparity 
between perspectives not as a negative moment to be sublated but as a 
potentially positive phenomenon. As is well known, for Deleuze, just as 
for Nietzsche, the Hegelian desire to overcome such disparity is a nonnec-
essary and ultimately “moral” preference for identity over difference, for 
peace and conformity over struggle and novelty, and so on. For Deleuze, as 
has just been said, the community’s attribution of responsibility to an agent 
for an action that outstrips what the agent understands herself to intend 
first and foremost confronts the agent as a problem. It is then a matter for 
the agent as to how to deal with that problem. The agent could, of course, 
enter into a process of reciprocal confession and forgiveness with her com-
munity, provided the power relations constitutive of the agent’s community 
allow for this type of relationship. Or the agent could treat the disparity 
between first- and third-person perspectives as involving all kinds of social 
and conceptual conditions that can themselves be creatively engaged with. 
To treat the problem in this way is to raise the difference between first- and 
third-person perspectives on action into what Deleuze calls in the Twenty-
Ninth Series the “crack of thought.”58
Now, throughout The Logic of Sense, Deleuze attributes a number of 
characteristics to the “crack of thought” that are important to the present 
argument. First, Deleuze maintains that it is at the “edges” of the crack that 
events take place, because the crack is a type of “frontier” uniting the two 
dimensions of bodies and language such that the event appears both as that 
which is happening in the realm of bodies and that which is expressed in 
propositions.59 Second, the crack is able to bring together bodies and sense 
in this way because it is a relation that is internal to thought. Deleuze expli-
cates this idea initially by speaking of the crack as akin to Kantian inner 
sense (under the form of time), through which the transcendental thinking 
I is related to the empirical self, and in such a way that the representations 
(intuitions) of this empirical self are synthesized and give rise to the self’s 
experience of a temporally coherent world.60 For Deleuze, however, the 
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crack of thought (which he also calls the “line of Aion”) is not something 
internal to the individual thinking subject. It, rather, marks an impersonal 
“surface of thought” and is constituted by the division examined above 
between, on the one hand, the denotation of states of affairs and senses and, 
on the other hand, the expressed sense-to-be-progressively-determined of 
these denoting propositions in an intersubjective context.61 With regard to 
those events that are actions, then, it is clear that my relation to my action is 
bound up with my relation to others, as well as with the sense that is made 
of this action. For the most part, of course, both my proximate others and I 
understand my intentions-actions in much the same way. However, when 
others and I do not agree about what it is I am doing, a “crack,” which, for 
Deleuze, was present all along, becomes evident in the form of a difference 
between what the action is for me and what it is for others. This situation, 
of course, prevents my action from being successful and upsets my sense 
of autonomy. The appropriate response, then, is to creatively engage with 
the social and conceptual conditions that are constitutive of this difference 
of perspective. And by expressively engaging with these social and concep-
tual conditions, new self- and collective understandings have the potential 
to emerge.
But now, further to this point, we can note that Deleuze explicitly rec-
ommends adopting a particular practico-normative attitude to the crack of 
thought. This becomes clear in the “Twenty-Second Series—Porcelain and 
Volcano.” His advice boils down to this: Never let the “truth” of the event on 
the line of Aion or in the crack of thought be confused with how it is made 
sense of or actualized at a given moment; always double the actualization 
with an expressive “counteractualization.” In other words, like Nietzsche, 
Deleuze sees value in keeping open the process of the production of the 
sense of the events constitutive of one’s life. It is in this process, he thinks, 
that “our greatest freedom lies—the freedom by which we develop and lead 
the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters 
of actualizations.”62 Moreover, Deleuze ventures to suggest, it is perhaps 
“only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything 
that is good and great in humanity enters and exits.”63 As he puts it, “To 
be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a 
 counter-actualization, the identification with a distance, like the true actor 
and dancer, is to give the truth of the event the only chance of not being con-
fused with its inevitable actualization. It is to give to the crack the chance of 
flying over its own incorporeal surface area . . . ; it is, finally, to give us the 
chance to go farther than we would have believed possible.”64
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By way of conclusion, then, we can say that insofar as Deleuze rejects 
the voluntarist conception of agency in favor of an expressive one, he also 
rejects a common approach to the relation between norms and action. Nor-
mativity clearly does, however, feature in Deleuze’s account of action and 
agency. It is present at the level of act-descriptions, since the structural-sym-
bolic dimension of language and culture is governed by norms specifying 
how and what concepts are correct or appropriate to apply in speaking about 
particular actions. Moreover, Deleuze appears to recognize that a successful 
action—just insofar as it is successful—is a normative status that depends 
on an agent and his community recognizing the agent’s relation to the action 
in the same way, which is to say, the action as falling under an agreed-upon 
description. Finally, Deleuze, like Nietzsche, sees value in treating conflicts 
between perspectives on action as potentials for creative transformation. 
We might even consider this a Deleuzean norm that, like the Nietzschean 
valorization of perspectival agonism, is opposed to the Hegelian norms of 
confession and forgiveness: “Raise the difference between first- and third-
person perspectives on action into a ‘crack of thought’ engaging, and capa-
ble of transforming, all kinds of social and conceptual coordinates.”
Finally, to bring this discussion full circle by returning to the issue of 
the moral or ethical dimension of action and agency, it is clear that Deleuze 
would reject any account of normative ethics that focuses on justifying 
the claims that already freestanding moral norms are supposed to make 
on the formation of the ethical agent’s intentions prior to the action these 
intentions are causally related to. But what is Deleuze’s positive account 
of ethics in The Logic of Sense? In a brief and enigmatic passage, he writes 
that “either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has 
nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.”65 What 
exactly does this mean? It has been my contention that, for Deleuze, what 
happens to us is ontologically inseparable from the unfolding of an incor-
poreal event that expresses it and nonisolatable from the expression of the 
sense of this event in perspectivally multiple and even conflicting proposi-
tions. Moreover, it has been my contention that even our actions, since we 
do not cause them in any direct and transparent way, “happen to us”: they 
are not so much “willed” as “produced” in an intersubjective context. To 
“become worthy” of our actions-events, then, means to make them our own 
by engaging with them in their expressivity, which is to say, by expressively 
engineering in an open-ended process what will be held to have been our 
intentions-actions. In other words, for the Deleuze of The Logic of Sense, 
ethics has to do with the expressive “counteractualization” of the actions 
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and other events  making up our life history.66 The norms or principles that 
will be taken to be the bases of our actions will not be given in advance of 
our effective and expressive activity. But neither will they be given in isola-
tion from our fellows. They will, rather, be produced in an ongoing way 
over time and in our often difficult relations with others.
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